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THE INFLUENCE OF PRICE ON
THE NORTH ATLANTIC AIRLINE MARKET
By DR. W. M. WALLACEt
R ECENT International Air Transport Association (hereinafter IATA)
fare negotiations will result in a substantial North Atlantic fare re-
duction. The purpose of this study is to estimate the consequences of this
reduction on North Atlantic traffic. The approach is based on demand
curve analysis, and past traffic trends are examined with a view of isolating
the effect of such historical fare reductions as the introduction of tourist
and economy classes from other variables such as better equipment and
improving economic conditions.
Figure I depicts the historical growth of the so-called North Atlantic
market which includes traffic between all of the United States and Canada
and Europe, including the West Coast United States polar flights. North
Atlantic airline traffic began in 1939 with the introduction by Pan Ameri-
can of the Boeing 314. Because of World War II, however, a better be-
ginning point is 1946, at which time the four engine land-based aircraft
replaced the slow and obsolescent flying boats.
Initially only first class scheduled service was offered, but in 1952 tourist
class service was introduced with an immediate and pronounced apparent
traffic response. Charter traffic, between 12,000 and 16,000 passengers
from 1948 to 1953, doubled to 30,000 in 1954 and, except for 1960, has
grown rapidly. Economy class was introduced in 1958 and, unlike the
United States domestic market, no "growth pause" occurred during that
year. Instead a twenty-six per cent increase was recorded.
During the post war period first class traffic has erratically declined in
absolute importance and steadily declined in relative importance, as new
and less expensive services have been introduced. First class traffic now
stands below ten per cent of the total. The first class trend, nonetheless,
warrants examination. As Figure I shows, first class traffic during the
1946-1951 period developed a stabilized growth trend of about ten to
eleven per cent. This trend, extrapolated on a gradually diminishing basis,
appears to be the growth likely to have been experienced in the absence
of effective fare reductions. To this "first class only" trend can be assigned
the approximate influence of improved equipment (divorced from lower
fares), the rapidly improving European economy as well as the growth in
the United States and Canadian economies. Such a trend would have pro-
duced about 750,000 1962 passengers plus perhaps 50,000 or so additional
charter passengers. It is interesting to note that in 1954, when first class
traffic hit a low point, it resumed growth at about the same previous rate.
In 1960, when economy class service almost completely supplanted tourist
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class and heavy jet scheduling became established, first class traffic again
declined. The greater price spread, combined with much faster jet sched-
ules, appears to have made first class travel even less attractive. Possibly
the new lower first class fare may, to some extent, halt the decline of
first class travel.
It appears that by 1962 about 750,000 people would have been willing
to fly at first class fares over the North Atlantic. Only 210,000 in fact
did, indicating that the airlines "diluted their revenues" by about 540,000
passengers. Offsetting this, it appears that 1,800,000 new passengers were
"induced" to fly because of the lower rates. If one assumes a 4,000 mile
average one way trip length, a 9.50 first class yield vs. a 6.00 economy
plus charter yield, there was a "revenue loss" of $205,200,000 compared
to a "revenue gain" of $432,000,000 for the year 1962. Gains offset losses
therefore, by about $226,800,000. Because seat-mile costs continued to
decline during this time the net result was favorable.
In 1963 traffic, scheduled traffic grew at about six per cent, total traffic
somewhat more. It is interesting to note that fares were slightly increased
in 1963, a year of comparatively modest growth. This is also evidence of
price sensitivity in the North Atlantic market. Such evidence conforms
to standard economic theory which holds luxury goods and services to
be price elastic while essential goods and services tend to be inelastic. From
seventy to ninety per cent of the North Atlantic market is pleasure travel,
according to most estimates, and can therefore be regarded as a luxury.
Given the early character of the North Atlantic traffic curve, it is
reasonable to presume that non-price stimulants exerted relatively greater
effect in the early years compared to the present. While price has declined
substantially, the improvements in such factors as speed, safety, comfort
and convenience have been relatively much greater. Then too, the growth
of Europe's economy, from 1947 to the present, is certainly greater than
can be presumed for a similar future period. Thus, non-price traffic stimu-
lants very likely have a declining impact on traffic, while price, on the
other hand, appears likely to exert an ever growing impact.
Non-price forces have the effect of moving or shifting a demand curve,
to the right if positive, to the left if negative. The "shift forces" are
approximately defined by the "first class only" trend shown in Figure I.
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Given these shift factors it is possible to calculate the isolated influence
of price over time. Figure II is a summary of these calculations. The de-
mand curves are shown for the last year of each five year period since
1946 and labeled by year. The 1946 curve is arbitrary. The actual traffic
achieved at the actual 1962 constant dollar yield is indicated by the en-
circled data plots at the lower end of each year's curve. The dotted line
moving tq the right from an qatual point indicates what the traffic would
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have been had no price change occurred during the following five years.
For example, in 1956 a yield slightly under nine cents produced about 3.4
billion revenue passenger miles, as shown by the enclosed circle point
near the bottom of the 1956 demand curve. The dotted line moving direct-
ly to the right indicates the effect of non-price factors which shift demand
to the right. Thus about 5.1 billion revenue passenger miles might have
been expected by 1961 with no change in real price. In fact over 8.5 billion
revenue passenger miles were produced at a yield of slightly under seven
cents, indicated by the encircled data point at the lower end of the 1961
demand curve.
The incremental growth of price-stimulated traffic for the final year
of each five year period is shown in Figure III. Note the almost perfect
linear function on ratio scale. An extrapolation for one additional period
to 1966 produced about eleven billion revenue passenger miles. Presumably,
however, this trend like most semi-log trends, will diminish in rate. Accord-
ingly, a lower value appears somewhat more reasonable. The lower curve
produces 7.8 billion additional passenger miles with a yield of slightly
under five cents.
A major monopoly carrier has, based upon its experience, theorized
that two years, or the biennium, is a better unit of time over which to
assess the growth of the air travel market. If North Atlantic historical
traffic data are placed on a biennium basis, a very interesting trend emerges,
as Figure IV shows. Biennial growth has held at a constant rate of about
eighteen per cent during the past seventeen years with almost no devia-
tion. Projected to the 1966/67 biennium, North Atlantic traffic attains a
volume of about 44.00 billion. This trend tends to confirm the demand
analysis presented above. The growing impact of price appears to be
compensating for the diminishing impact of non-price factors, leaving a
constant growth rate.
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is estimated that the current IATA
fare reductions will stimulate substantial traffic growth in the North
Atlantic market until about 1966. The growth rate after 1966 may de-
cline sharply to about five to six per cent if no further fare reductions
are made, but should continue at a much higher rate if further fare re-
ductions can be made.
The economics of the aircraft themselves as well as the system within
which they operate will determine the practical level to which yield should
fall to maximize revenues and profits.
It is obvious, however, the optimum yield has been decreasing over
time as seat mile costs decline. No doubt there will come a point below
which seat mile costs are not apt to decline. An optimum yield with respect
to this point might then emerge, which could, other things remaining
normal, be the cause of the final large spurt of North Atlantic traffic
growth. Further growth would probably be erratic, assuming the char-
acter of an upward drift at low average annual rates.
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